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Empirical studies about the impact of immigration on the main labor market outcomes of the
host country have not found unambiguously evidence of the detrimental effect predicted by the
theory. A possible explanation could be the fact that natives are able to elude the increasing
immigrants-induced competition by specializing in those jobs in which they have a comparative
advantage on immigrants. Using occupational task-intensity data from the O*NET dataset and
Italian Labor Force Survey data from 2014 to 2019, I demonstrate that, because of immigration,
natives reallocate their task supply towards more communicative-intensive jobs and leave those
manual-intensive. In particular, I find that a 1% increase in the share of immigrants is associated
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Migration is surely a long-standing phenomenon in human history. In more recent years, how-
ever, migration has assumed a series of characteristics that have dramatically changed its im-
portance among policymakers’ priorities.
Firstly, globalization and technological progress have been able to reduce the “distances”
between the different parts of the world, facilitating the movement of people and consequently
increasing the magnitude of the international flows. United Nations estimates that in the last
20 years the number of people living in a country which is not that where they were born has
almost doubled, passing from 150 to 272 million globally. Moreover, it is worth noting that the
growth rate of migrants is even higher than that of the world population itself, the reason why
the share of foreign-born individuals over the total population increased from 2.8% in 2000 to
3.5% in 2020 (United Nations, 2020). And this trend is expected to remain the same for many
years, as the population in the main sending countries is projected to continue to increase at a
very high pace.
Secondly, the patterns through which immigration happens are completely changed com-
pared to the first half of the previous century. In fact, the number of migrants not only increased
in traditional receiving countries such as the United States, but also in other developed countries
with little experience of labor force import and even in historical immigrants-sending countries,
like Spain or Italy. Including the fact that two-thirds of the total migrants decide to emigrate
for working reason is considered, it is clear that immigrants have inevitably become a structural
part of the labor force in an increasing number of developed countries.
Lastly, the concomitance of this large increase in the number of people emigrating from
their country of origin with a deep economic crisis like that occurred in 2008 also created
an intense climate of aversion towards immigrants from the majority of the public opinion.
This widespread sentiment actually has given rise to the ascension of many populist and anti-
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immigration parties in almost all developed countries, the most representative examples given
by the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President in 2016 and his propose of building “the
Wall” on the U.S. Mexican borders and the victory of the “Leave” in the “Brexit” referendum in
the same year, with the consequential decision of the United Kingdom of leaving the European
free labor market.
For all these reasons, immigration has recently attracted increasing attention also in the aca-
demic environment. The new challenges and questions arose from the great inflow of people
in an always larger number of receiving countries have led many economists to spend more
time and effort addressing this topic, especially for its policy implications. This has obviously
resulted in a vast literature concerning the relationship between this demographic phenomenon
and different aspects of the society: to make just some examples, economists have studied how
immigration affects innovation (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Ozgen et al., 2012), fiscal
balances (Lee and Miller, 2000), but also crimes (Bell et al., 2013) and voting (Halla et al.,
2017). However, the topic on which scholars have focused the most is indeed the effect on
labor market outcomes. Economists have investigated for decades how the arrival of people
from foreign countries may affect wages and employment opportunities of natives, both from
a theoretical and an empirical point of view. However, while the canonic theoretical models
have reached unambiguously negative conclusions (even though extremely sensitive to the as-
sumptions imposed), the multitude of empirical studies on the impact of immigration in the host
country labor market has not been able to confirm unequivocally such results.
These outcomes prompt some researches to extend the theoretical models, taking into ac-
count the possibility that labor markets may actually be able to fully absorb immigration without
experiencing any negative impact. In this regard, an example is provided by Lewis (2013), who
shows that allowing firms to change their technology in production after immigration could sig-
nificantly lower the negative effects induced by the introduction of the foreign-born workers in
the labor market. This dissertation, however, tries to find evidence supporting the intuition de-
veloped by Peri and Sparber (2009): their idea is that natives and immigrants cannot be consid-
ered as perfect substitutes since the former have inevitably a better knowledge of the language
(at least among low-skilled workers). Under this assumption, an increase in the share of immi-
grants increases the supply of manual-intensive jobs (in which immigrants have a comparative
advantage), lowering the wage of these occupations. The fundamental difference, however is
that in this context natives do not suffer passively this drop in compensation but react by special-
izing in those jobs in which immigrants cannot compete, that is those in which communication
and language proficiency are relatively more important.
8 Introduction
To prove this, I use Italian Labor Force Survey data from 2014 to 2019. Following the
example of Peri and Sparber (2009), I match each individual’s occupation in my database with
an index measuring the relative supply of communicative versus manual tasks related to that
job. In particular, in order to compute this indicator I exploit the O*NET database provided
by the U.S. Department of Labor, which furnishes information about the importance of 52
distinct employee abilities for more than 950 occupations. Subsequently, I consider each Italian
provinces as an independent local labor market and, using a spatial approach, I estimate the
effect that an increase in the share of immigrants has on the relative communicative task supply
of a native individual. This kind of approach, however, suffers from an endogeneity problem,
since immigrants are not randomly distributed among local labor markets. For this reason,
I rely on an Instrumental Variable approach, by using immigrants distribution by country of
origin in 2003 as a proxy for the share of foreign-born workers in a local labor market. The
results confirm the theoretical assumptions, finding that a one percentage-point rise in the share
of immigrants in a local labor market is associated with a 0.72 percent increase in the relative
supply of communicative versus manual tasks by natives. In particular, this increase is mostly
explained by a drop in the supply of manual tasks, rather than by an increase in the supply of
communicative ones.
This thesis is so structured: Chapter 2 initially summarizes the main predictions of different
theoretical models concerning the labor market effects of immigration (including the theoretical
model of Peri and Sparber 2009 about natives’ task specialization) and later, briefly review the
vast empirical literature on the topic; Chapter 3, after having reported some telling data about
immigration in Italy during my period of analysis, describes my database and explains the
empirical strategy that I have chosen to employ in order to correctly estimate my causal effect
of interest, focusing especially on the construction and the validity of the shift-share instrument
I used; Chapter 4 reports the main results of my analysis, performing also some robustness
checks and the Oster test for eventual omitted variable bias; Chapter 5 concludes.
Chapter 2
The Labor Market Effects of Immigration
In this chapter, I summarize the literature concerning the labor market effects of immigration
to analyze what economists already know and also to understand why a recent branch of this
literature has focused on the possibility that natives do not suffer in a passive way the new com-
petition arising from immigration but may react to it by changing their role in production. The
chapter is so structured: Section 1 explains the theoretical predictions about the impact of immi-
gration, starting from a very simple demand and supply model and then improving it by making
more rational assumptions. Afterwards, I show how, by making realistic suppositions on the
different abilities of immigrants and natives, the theory is able to predict tasks specialization of
natives in response to an immigration shock. In Section 2, instead, I summarize the multitude
of empirical works on this topic: initially talking about the labor market impact of immigration
in general, showing that even using different techniques, results continue to be conflicting; fi-
nally going into the details of those papers more connected with the purpose of this dissertation,




My analysis concerning the effect of immigration on wages and employment of natives starts
from a simple model where all workers are considered equal to each other. Although unrealistic,
this model is quite useful to understand what are the main forces that an inflow of workers from
abroad activates in a labor market.
Suppose for simplicity that the host country economy produces a single good using a pro-
duction function which combines capital (K) and homogeneous labor (L), so that the output is
9
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equal to Y = F(K, L). This production function is twice differentiable, continuous and concave,
so that FK and FL > 0 and FKK and FLL < 0. Moreover, the production function is homoge-
nous of degree 1, which implies FKL > 0. Since labor is homogeneous all workers are perfect
substitutes and then the workforce is equal to the sum of natives and immigrants (L = N + M).
Let the price of output be fixed and equal to p. I assume the labor market to be fully
competitive, which implies that each input price is equal to its value of the marginal product.
Therefore, in a pre-immigration equilibrium (where M = 0), the price of labor and the rental
rate of capital are respectively:
w0 = pFL(K,N) (2.1)
r0 = pFK(K,N) (2.2)
The labor demand function of firms coincides with Equation (2.1), whereas the labor supply of
households positively depends on the wage w and is described by a simple linear function S(w).
In the short-run, capital is assumed to be fixed and owned only by natives, so that immi-
grants do not affect the amount of K. In this simple model, an inflow of immigrants in the
country increases the labor force by the same amount, which implies a rightward shift of the
labor supply curve. As can be seen from Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, the rise in the workforce
reduces the amount of physical capital per worker, lowering the marginal labor productivity
and, consequently, the market-clearing wage. This is the first result of the model:
Prediction 1 In a model with homogeneous labor, immigration has the effect of lowering the
market wage in the short run.
Figure 2.1 depicts the effect of immigration when labor supply is finite elastic. From the
graph it is possible to see that the supply shock induced by immigration has the effect of in-
creasing the number of employed workers in the economy too; however, it is evident that, in
this case, the increase in the aggregate supply of labor is lower than the number of immigrants
entering in the market. In fact, while at the old wage w0 N0 native workers were employed, now
at the new wage w1 only an amount N1 of natives is willing to participate in the labor market. It
is noteworthy to specify that this reduction in the number of employed natives does not imply
an increase in unemployment, but rather in the number of inactive workers.
But this result is heavily conditioned by the assumption I made about the elasticity of labor
supply. As can be seen from Figure 2.2, if I assume, instead, that labor supplies of both natives
and immigrants are perfectly inelastic, the adjustment process occurring in the labor market
after an immigration shock is now fully accommodated through a reduction of the market wage,
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Figure 2.1: The effects of immigration with finite elastic labor supply
Figure 2.2: The effects of immigration with inelastic labor supply
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Figure 2.3: The effect of immigration in a market with wage rigidities
triggering no effect on the level of employment among natives.
Prediction 2 The decrease in wages imposed by immigration reduces the number of natives
participating in the labor market, lowering employment among them. This effect is lower the
lower the elasticity of labor supply, with no reduction in employment when supply is perfectly
inelastic.
Analyzing European labor markets, it is also important to remember that many countries
(including Italy) are characterized by the presence of many institutions (e.g. high minimum
wages, strict employment protections and generous unemployment benefits) that, through their
effects on the workers’ reservation wage and the possibility for firms of firing and hiring their
employees, make the wage adjustment process very downwardly rigid. Figure 2.3 shows the
effect of immigration in a market where the wage cannot go below its pre-immigration market-
clearing level. Obviously, since wage does not decrease, the number of native workers willing to
participate in the market remains equal and the post-immigration labor force in the economy is
then N+M. However, at w, firms are willing to hire just N0 workers, so that M workers become
now involuntary unemployed (Boeri and Van Ours, 2013). The amount of job losses imputable
to native workers is difficult to establish a priori and depends on the market penetration of
immigrants.
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Prediction 3 In a labor market with wage rigidities, immigration increases involuntary unem-
ployment.
Going back to the generic case with fully flexible wages, the complementarity between the
two factor inputs implies that a reduction in the price of labor (which is triggered by immigra-
tion) is accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the return of capital1. In the long run, capital
is not fixed anymore and is allowed to adjust to the increased number of workers. The short-run
rise in its price encourages inflows of the input until the rental rate in the economy reaches the
world price level. At this point, the pre-immigration capital-labor ratio is restored and so it is
the marginal labor productivity. In fact, as shown by Borjas (2013), in the long run what he





= sKcLK + sLcLL = 0 (2.3)
where si is the income share accruing to factor i and the last equality follows from the fact that
linear homogeneity of the production function implies
∑︁
j s jci j = 0. Graphically, this situation
is represented by a horizontal labor demand curve at w0.
Prediction 4 In a model with homogeneous labor, in the long run the market wage returns
at its pre-immigration level and immigration has the only effect of increasing the scale of the
economy.
In summary, while in the short run immigration should produce negative effects on either
natives’ wage or employment or even both simultaneously, in the long run the economy is
expected to absorb completely the supply shock without suffering any detrimental consequence.
2.1.2 Heterogeneous Labor
Although the previous model is able to predict well the main effects that an inflow of new work-
ers from abroad has on the labor market, the assumption that all workers are equal (and then
hit by immigration in the same way) seems not too realistic. In fact, immigrants are usually
concentrated at the opposite extremes of the skill spectrum: as a consequence, immigration not
only increases the aggregate number of workers in the economy, but also modify the skill com-
position of the workforce. In the literature concerning this kind of problem, skills of workers
1Borjas (2013) shows that dlnrdlnL
⃓⃓⃓
dK=0 = sLcKL > 0 where cKL =
FKLF
FK FL
is defined as the elasticity of complemen-
tarity between K and L, which is positive since FKL > 0 by linear homogeneity of the production function, and sL
is the income share accruing to labor.
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are usually differentiated by their level of educational attainment and their working experience,
measured as the number of years passed since they left education.
Models that try to capture the effects of this variation usually rely on a production function
of the following type:
Y = F(K, LS , LU) (2.4)
where LS and LU are the number of skilled and unskilled workers in the economy, respectively.
I assume also that, within each skill group, immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes and
that the production function has the same properties as in the homogeneous labor case.
At the aggregate level, the increase in the amount of workforce due to immigration is ex-
pected to lower, in the short run, the average wage among skill groups, through a mechanism
like that illustrated in the homogeneous labor market2. However, in this model this is not the
only effect worth of attention:
Prediction 5 In a model with heterogeneous labor, immigration decreases the relative wage of
the group that experiences the larger supply shock (Borjas, 2013).
Regarding that, suppose, for example, that the economy receives an inflow of immigrants
relatively less skilled than natives, which is the case more likely to happen in my country of
interest, Italy. Following Prediction 5, this inflow will decrease the factor price of unskilled
labor with respect to that of skilled one. In fact, it easy to show that the wage of unskilled
workers will indeed decline because of the drop in its marginal factor productivity and, though
the impact on the wage of the skilled workers is a priori ambiguous (the sign depends on
the magnitude of the elasticity of complementarity between skilled and unskilled), reasonable
simulations show that skilled workers suffer a decline in wage too, but in a smaller proportion
than is the case of the unskilled (Cahuc et al., 2014, p. 724). On the contrary, if the inflow of
immigrants has the same skill distribution of the native workforce, the relative wage structure
will not be affected and the only effect that is expected is that on the mean wage.
In the previous model, I have shown how the effects of immigration can dramatically change
by considering the long run rather than the short run. As before, the reduction in the average
wage level increases the price of the complementary input, attracting new capitals and restoring
the pre-immigration capital-labor ratio. Again this means that, in the long run, immigration
leaves the average wage among skill groups unaffected. Moreover, Borjas (2014, p. 69) shows
2In particular, Borjas (2014) shows that in the case of a nested CES production function the decrease in the
average wage in the heterogeneous labor model is the same as in the case of homogeneous labor.
2.1 Theoretical Predictions 15
that this result is independent of the skill distribution of immigrants. Unlike the mean wage,
however, the wage structure of the economy may remain altered even in the long run:
Prediction 6 In the long run, immigration lowers the wage of the group in which immigrants
are relatively more abundant than natives and rises the wage of the group in which natives are
relatively more abundant. If immigrants and natives have the same skill distribution there is no
effect on the economy wage structure (Borjas, 1999).
Therefore, in a heterogeneous labor market, the skill distribution of immigrants decides which
group of workers gains and which loses from immigration.
2.1.3 The Effects on Task Specialization
The results I have just explained in a market with heterogeneous labor rely on the assumption
that immigrants and natives in the same skill group are equal and then perfect substitute in
production. However, many papers show that immigrants and natives present a small but signif-
icant degree of imperfect substitution within education-experience groups (see Ottaviano and
Peri 2012 and Card 2009b for the U.S., Manacorda et al. 2012 for the U.K. and D’Amuri et al.
2010 for Germany)3. If we focus on low-skilled immigration, the assumption that natives and
foreign-born workers do not compete for the same jobs seems to be reasonable. In fact, while
immigrants may likely possess physical or “manual” skills very similar to those of native-born
workers, it is quite realistic to imagine that the two groups are not comparable in terms of lan-
guage, or more generally “communicative”, skills. Therefore, natives may react to the reduction
in wage due to the bigger competition in physical jobs by specializing in those tasks in which
they have a comparative advantage.
Peri and Sparber (2009) developed a simple theoretical model which well predicts the effect
of immigration on natives’ task specialization. In this model, the two authors consider an open
economy that produces a single tradable good, combining two non-tradable services (YH and













The final good is the numeraire and it is assembled by perfectly competitive firms, so that
3However, as I will write later, these estimates are not free from defects (see p. 19)
4In Equation (2.5), the parameter σ ∈ (0,∞) measures the elasticity of substitution between YH and YL while
the coefficients β and (1 − β) capture the relative productivity of the two intermediate services in the production of
good Y .
16 The Labor Market Effects of Immigration
wi is equal to the marginal product of the service Yi. The intermediate service YL is provided by
the low-educated workers (L), while YH by the high-educated ones (H)5.
Less-educated workers must perform both manual and communication tasks in order to pro-
duce YL. According to the definition of Peri and Sparber (2009) manual tasks require physical
skills (e.g. dexterity, body coordination, strength), whereas communication tasks require mostly











where M and C are the aggregate units of manual-tasks and communication-tasks, respectively.
For simplicity, since Peri and Sparber (2009) focuses only on less-educated workers, they make
the assumptions that high-educated workers perform a unique “analytical” tasks and that YH
is produced by a linear technology equal to the total supply of highly-educated working hours
(YH = H).











where wM and wC denote the compensation paid for one unit of manual and communication
task, respectively.
While highly-educated workers are identical from a productive point of view, less-educated
ones are heterogeneous and may differ from each other from their relative task productivity.
Obviously, less-educated workers are also distinguished between domestic “native-born” work-
ers (D) and “foreign-born” workers (F). The model is based on the assumption that natives and
immigrants differ in that the first have a comparative advantage in performing communication
tasks. Mathematically, if I define µ j and ζ j as the efficiency of worker-type j in manual and
communicative tasks respectively, the previous assumption implies (ζD/µD) > (ζF/µF).
Each worker takes the unit compensation paid to tasks (wM and wC) as given and then
5Peri and Sparber (2009) define as low-educated all workers with a high-school diploma or less and as high-
educated all workers with some college degree or more, following the results of the quite abundant literature that
finds high substitutability between workers with no degree and those with a high-school diploma and between
those with some college education and those with a college degree (see, for example, Goldin and Katz 2007 and
Ottaviano and Peri 2008) and a significant degree of imperfect substitutability between workers with a high school
diploma or less and those with some degree of education or more (D’Amuri et al., 2010; Ottaviano and Peri, 2008).
6In Equation (2.6), the coefficient βL ∈ (0, 1) captures the relative productivity of manual skills and θL ∈ (0,∞)
measures the elasticity of substitution between M and C.
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chooses to allocate her labor endowment between m j manual tasks units and c j communication















The equilibrium relative supply of communication versus manual tasks for natives and immi-
grants in Equation (2.8) depends positively on relative task compensation and on the worker’s
relative efficiency in performing tasks7.
By summing the skills provided by each group, the authors define the aggregate relative






= φ( f )
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MF




The term φ( f ) is the share of manual tasks supplied by foreign-born workers (MF/(MD + MF))
and is a monotonic increasing function of the foreign-born share of less-educated workers
(LF/(LD + LF)). Substituting Equation (2.8) in (2.9) and equating relative supply with rela-

























is a weighted average of the relative skill endowments among natives
and immigrants and it is an aggregate measure of communication versus manual ability in the
economy. This function depends: negatively on f because, since immigrants have a comparative
advantage in manual tasks, a larger share of immigrants in the economy decreases the average
relative communication ability of the workforce; positively on ζF
µF
because the lower the relative
communication ability of the immigrants, the lower the average of this ability is in the economy.
The equilibrium wage uniquely determines the level of the relative supply of tasks for each













































7The parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that enters in the worker’s maximization problem and captures the
decreasing returns from performing a single task, which implies that no workers will fully specialize.
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Figure 2.4: The effects of low-skilled immigration on task specialization
Now the model is set up and I am able to predict theoretically the effects that we want to
estimate in the following chapters. Suppose that the economy experiences an increase in the
share of immigrants in the population ( f ).
Prediction 7 Lowering the average relative ability ζ
µ
(·), an inflow of low-skilled immigrants
has three effect:
1. it increases the return to communication relative to manual tasks (Equation 2.10);




, in turn, implies an increase in the relative supply of communication
tasks by natives (Equation 2.11);
3. it decreases the aggregate relative supply of communication tasks in the economy (Equa-
tion 2.12).
Figure 2.4 displays the results of Prediction 7. The fact that natives have a comparative
advantage in language-intensive tasks implies that the relative task supply curve of immigrants
(black line) is to the left of that of domestic workers (blue line). Equation (2.9) states that the
aggregate relative task supply (red line) is a weighted average of the natives and immigrants
relative supplies. Then, it lies in the between of them, with the distance of it from the two
proportional to φ( f ) and 1 − φ( f ). An increase in f rises the share of manual tasks supplied by
the foreign-born workers φ( f ), moving the red line towards the black one. Since, thanks to the
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new immigrants, more manual tasks are provided in the economy, the relative compensation of







)1, prompting natives to specialize in that
kind of occupations. These effects are magnified in the case of an inflow of new immigrants
with a ζF
µF
lower than that of the immigrants already in the economy.
2.2 Empirical Literature
Theoretical models, even though sensible to the assumptions imposed, reach quite unarguable
predictions about the effects of immigration on the host country labor market outcomes. In the
last decades, many economists have tried to find confirmations to these predictions in the real
world, however without reaching equally indisputable conclusions (for a complete review, see
Okkerse 2008 or Edo 2019). Even though based on the same canonical model, the studies cop-
ing with the estimation of immigration’s labor market effects are often based on very different
empirical models. A first distinction can be made which separates studies that use structural
and non-structural approaches.
In a few words, structural methods build on a theoretical framework and, after having esti-
mated the main parameters of the model, try to simulate the impact of immigration on wages
or employment. Being theory-driven however, the results of this kind of researches are strongly
affected by the assumptions of the model or by the lack of it to capture particular characteris-
tics or adjustment processes in the economy. In summary, these studies find evidence that in
the long-run the average effect of immigration on wages is either null or even positive. These
results depend on the degree of substitution between immigrants and natives estimated: papers
that find evidence that immigrants and natives are close substitutes conclude that immigration
does not affect wages (Borjas, 2014; Edo and Toubal, 2015); instead, papers that find some
degree of imperfect substitution observe a positive effect (D’Amuri et al., 2010; Ottaviano and
Peri, 2012; Brücker et al., 2014). However, these last estimates should be taken with a grain of
salt, since downgrading and misclassification of immigrants across skill cells may impair them,
biasing also the effect of immigration on labor market outcomes (Dustmann and Preston, 2012).
Unlike structural methods, non-structural ones estimate (rather than simulate) the effect of
immigration on labor market by exploiting the fact that immigrants are not evenly distributed
across geographical areas (Spatial Approach) and skill groups (National Skill-Cell Approach).
The “spatial approach” is based on the idea that every geographical area (i.e. cities, provinces,
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regions) can be seen as a local labour market and that areas with low levels of immigrants can
be considered as counterfactuals of those with high levels. The parameter estimated can be in-
terpreted as the overall effect of immigration on employment and average wage level. However,
this method does not reach results that unambiguously determine these effects: Altonji and Card
(1991) and Jaeger et al. (2018), for example, observe a negative effect on native wages, while
Dustmann et al. (2013) find that in UK immigration exerts downward wage pressure below the
20th percentile of the wage distribution (where immigrants are denser), but a positive effect in
the upper part of the wage distribution, concluding that the overall effect on wages is positive.
A result observed also by Card (2009a). Moreover, this approach is not conceptually flawless:
first, it is difficult to understand if the estimates refer to a (presumably negative) short-run effect
or instead to a (presumably null or positive) long-run effect (Jaeger et al., 2018); second, the as-
sumption that local labor markets are close is hard to believe since native workers and firms are
free to move across areas and then their response may weaken the real effect of an immigrant
supply shock (Card, 2001).
In order to not incur in the second conceptual issue of the “spatial approach”, Borjas (2003)
developed what is called the “national skill-cell approach”. Instead of exploiting variation be-
tween geographical areas, this method uses differences in immigrants penetration among dif-
ferent skill-cell groups (defined in terms of both education and work experience) to estimate
the effect of immigration on workers’ outcomes. The advantage of this strategy is that for an
individual should be more costly to improve her skills rather than changing area in response to
an immigration inflow. Most of these papers agree in concluding that immigrants harm natives’
wages (Borjas, 2003, 2014; Llull, 2017). As regards employment, D’Amuri et al. (2010) find
no detrimental effect on natives, but a significantly negative one on old immigrants. However,
Dustmann et al. (2016) strongly criticize this approach for two reasons: the first one is that
results obtained with the “spatial approach” and those obtained with the “national skill-cell ap-
proach” should not be compared because the latter structurally reaches more negative estimates,
since it estimates just the direct partial effect of immigrants in the same skill group of natives,
without considering the possible cross-effects produced by immigrants in the other groups, as
instead the former approach does; the second reason is that the “national skill-cell approach”
heavily suffers from the problem of immigrants downgrading (that is the fact that foreign-born
workers are usually employed in jobs that are worse than those in which are employed natives
with similar skills) and then estimates might be biased since immigrants and natives with the
same education and experience are not actually competing for the same jobs.
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The “spatial approach”, however, also suffers from another issue. Immigrants, in fact, tend
to settle in those areas where economic outcomes are better, arising an endogeneity problem be-
tween the share of immigrants and labor market outcomes. Natural experiments exploit the fact
that changes in political or historical contexts can trigger immigrants flows independent from
the host country economic outcomes. All this kind of papers observe a negative (or at most
null) short-run impact of immigration on both wages (Card, 1990; Hunt, 1992; Borjas, 2017)
and employment of natives (Hunt, 1992; Angrist and Kugler, 2003; Glitz, 2012). However, Peri
(2016) warns about the external validity of these researches, since they are characterized by
fast and unexpected inflows of foreign-born individuals, whereas usually immigration happens
through slower and more predictable patterns.
A recent branch of the literature has supposed that the previous conflicting results may be
due to the fact that host country labor market is able to absorb immigration without experi-
encing any significant short-run negative impact on natives wages or employment thanks to a
series of alternative adjustments. As I have shown in the previous section, one of them can be
the possibility that natives react to an increasing number of foreign-born workers by finding
occupation in those jobs in which they have a comparative advantage on immigrants and so
eluding their competition. As regards immigration and task specialization, the aforementioned
paper by Peri and Sparber (2009) is indeed the most important one. Analyzing decennial data
for U.S low-skilled workers from 1960 to 2000, they found that a 1% increase in the share of
immigrants is associated with a highly significant 0.37% rise in the natives’ relative supply of
communication tasks. This result is almost completely explained by an increase in the natives’
provision of language-intensive jobs rather than a decrease in that of physical-intensive ones.
Moreover, the authors also find that, differently from natives, long-term immigrants are not able
to shift toward more language-intensive occupations, providing support to the theory that sees
them as the most vulnerable to the competition with new immigrants (see for example Longhi
et al. 2008 and D’Amuri et al. 2010). Finally, this paper shows that immigrants more than
compensated the change in skills supply among natives, ensuring an increase in the overall rel-
ative manual task supply in the economy (as stated by Equation 1.12) and in the relative wage
compensation of communication tasks, which implies a smaller negative wage effect among
less-educated natives than that predicted by the models in which natives and immigrants are
perfect substitutes.
Amuedo-Dorantes and De La Rica (2011) investigate the same causal effect using Spanish
Labor Force Survey data from 2000 to 2008. They observe that also in Spain less-skilled im-
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migrants and natives do not appear to be perfect substitutes and, in particular, they find that the
effect of immigration on the relative task supply of natives in their research is twice as that found
in the United States. Moreover, the Spanish case is really interesting since almost half of the
immigrants comes from other Spanish-speaking countries and then, the assumption that natives
have a comparative advantage in host country language proficiency relative to those immigrants
seems to be invalidated. Authors find that actually Latino immigrants have a lower manual to
communicative tasks ratio than non-Latino immigrants, but the large effect they find on the task
specialization of natives induces them to conclude that, even if important, language proficiency
is not the unique driver of this adjustment process.
De la Rica and Polonyankina (2013) extends the paper by Amuedo-Dorantes and De La Rica
(2011) to account for the impact of immigration during the recession years 2008-2012, follow-
ing the results of Peri (2010) which find evidence that immigration has different consequences
in expansionary and recessionary periods. Using Spanish Labor Force data from 2001 to 2012,
the authors find that during the expansionary years (2001-2007) natives significantly respond
to immigration increasing their occupation in interactive relative to manual-intensive jobs, with
no negative effects on the employment rate of natives as well as that of non-recent immigrants.
However, the pattern completely changes during recession years. There is no evidence that na-
tives continue to reallocate themselves to different occupations in order to react to immigration
inflows. Furthermore, an analysis of employment rates shows that while natives do not suffer
any negative effect, non-recent immigrants notably do. This finding can be seen as a further
demonstration that new immigrants are more likely to be considered close substitutes of earlier
immigrants than of native workers.
D’Amuri and Peri (2014) analyze data of 15 European countries over the 1996-2010 period
and they find that a 1% increase in the share of foreign-born workers increases the relative sup-
ply of complex (abstract and communicative) relative to simple (routine and manual) occupa-
tions by between 0.05 and 0.07%. This labor market adjustment takes place with no detrimental
effect on natives’ employment rates. In fact, authors find evidence that immigration stimulates
hiring with no impact at all on separation rates for natives. Moreover, this paper offers two
further interesting findings: first, it finds that, although at a slower rate, the job upgrade did not
disappear during the Great Recession period (2007-2010); second, exploiting the differences in
the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) in the 15 counties of interest, it concludes that
job reallocation is stronger in low-EPL countries, especially for the less-educated workers.
Another interesting research on the topic is that by Polonyankina (2018). The paper studies
immigrants-induced natives reallocation in different stages of the business cycle for 18 Euro-
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pean Countries, divided into two groups: West and South Europe8 and Middle and East Europe
(post-communist economies)9. Using the Eurostat Labor Force Survey, the author finds evi-
dence of task specialization for natives in West and South Europe during expansionary years.
The effects, however, disappears during the Great Depression. As for post-communist countries
instead, no displacement effect of task specialization is found in either stage of the business
cycle. The author offers two possible explanations to the difference between the two groups of
countries: first, Middle and East countries have a lower number of immigrants than West and
South countries; second, the period of the analysis is just after the entrance of these countries in
Europe, when their economies have suffered large outflows of natives due to the open European
labor market.
Unfortunately, the literature concerning labor market effects of immigration in Italy is not
as wide as that for other countries, such as the United States or the UK. But all papers seem
to reach the same conclusion, that there is no clear evidence of a negative impact of immigra-
tion in this country. More specifically, Gavosto et al. (1999) find a slightly positive impact of
immigration on natives wages in the period from 1986 to 1995, mainly driven by that on blue-
collar workers. This result is confirmed also by Staffolani and Valentini (2010) who find that
immigration significantly rose both white-collars and blue-collars wages in Italy between 1994
and 2004. The conclusions reached by these two papers are not completely surprising since, as
already mentioned, wages in Italy are characterized by a sensitive downwardly rigidity. Then
following Prediction 3, it is more likely that immigration could have affected natives employ-
ment rates rather than their wages. However, Venturini and Villosio (2006) find no evidence that
immigration has worsened the natives’ probability of transition from and to unemployment in
the 1993-1997 period. More recently, Fusaro and López-Bazo (2018), analyzing Labour Force
Survey data from 2009 to 2017, find no detrimental effect of foreign-born workers on employ-
ment rates of natives but a slight one on blue-collar workers. To my best knowledge, there is no
paper which analyzes the existence of immigration-induced task specialization in Italy, as I will
try to do in this dissertation.
8Namely Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Great Britain, Belgium
9Namely Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria
Chapter 3
The Research Context and the Empirical
Strategy
This chapter starts my empirical analysis which has the purpose of testing whether the main im-
plications of the theoretical model developed by Peri and Sparber (2009) are valid also for the
Italian labor market. However, before focusing on my database and on the econometric tech-
niques that I have decided to employ, I chose to report also some telling data about immigration
in Italy which could be eventually useful later to better understand the final results. The chap-
ter is then structured as follows: Section 1 contextualizes my research, illustrating the history
and the main characteristics of immigration in my country of interest; Section 2 describes the
data, in particular the construction of the indices measuring the supply of communicative and
manual tasks by individuals, created exploiting the O*NET database; finally, Section 3 explains
my empirical strategy for the identification and the estimation of the effect of immigration on
natives’ task specialization, focusing particularly on the instrument used in order to get rid of
the endogeneity problem typical of the spatial approach.
3.1 Immigration in Italy
In Italy, immigration is a quite recent phenomenon, especially if compared with the history of
other countries such as the United States, the U.K. or France. For about one century, in fact,
Italy actually experienced large outflows of workers, eager to leave their homeland to seek for-
tune in the U.S., South America or other European countries as well. It has been only during
the Seventies, thanks to a flourishing period of economic expansion, that Italy has been able to
become the destination of huge flows of foreign-born workers and, as a consequence, to defi-
nitely change its status in immigrant-receiving country. In 1981, the first census of foreigners
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Figure 3.1: Number of immigrants in Italy, 2010-2020
by Istat revealed the presence of just 210,937 foreign residents in the Italian territory1, but it
was only the beginning of 30 years during which the number of immigrants in the country dra-
matically increased with no interruptions. Over the Nineties, the dissolution of the Yugoslavia
and the Soviet Union, as well as the idiosyncratic position of the country in the middle of
the Mediterranean Sea, attracted large inflows of individuals from countries such as Albania,
Romania, Marocco and Egypt. In those years, also the minorities coming from some Asian
developing countries (among the others, China, Philippines and India) increased their weight
in the spectrum of nationalities that were present in the country. Given these circumstances,
it was inevitable that in 2001 the number of foreign residents in Italy was exponentially rock-
eted to 1,334,889 (corresponding to 2.3% of the population)2. Immigration didn’t stop, so that
the number of foreign-born individuals continued to grow up at a high pace also over the first
decade of the XXI century: in this period however, the main driver became the enlargement
of the European Union to Central and East European countries (e.g. Romania and Bulgaria)
which enabled workers of these states to freely enter into the Italian labor market. It was only
in 2014 that, after approaching 5 million foreign residents, the growth rate significantly slowed,
as shown by Figure 3.1.
According to the Italian Bureau of Statistics (Istat), at the beginning of 2020, the non-Italian
regular residents in Italy amount to 5,306,548 individuals (almost 9% of the population)3. Their
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Table 3.1: Immigrants and natives distribution by geographical area







Notes: Personal elaboration of Istat data, updated to the 1st Jan-
uary 2020. North-west includes Valle d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria
and Lombardia; North-East includes Trentino Alto-Adige, Veneto,
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and Emilia-Romagna; Center includes Toscana,
Marche, Umbria and Lazio; South includes Abruzzo, Molise, Cam-
pania, Puglia, Basilicata and Calabria; Islands includes Sicilia and
Sardegna. Immigrants are all people without Italian citizenship.
to that of natives. As can be seen from Table 3.1, in fact, about 83% of immigrants live in
Northern and Central Italy, while only 66% of the whole population do. It is evident that while
natives tend to be distributed quite evenly among the different Italian macroregions, immigrants
tend to be clustered in the richest parts of the country and especially in the big cities (almost
15% of immigrants actually live in just 3 cities: Rome, Milan and Turin).
As previously explained, the results of the theoretical model that this paper wants to test
are strictly dependent on the fundamental assumption that natives own a comparative advantage
in communicative-intensive jobs with respect to immigrants, thanks to their better language
proficiency. This implies that one feature worth to be scrupulously analyzed for the purpose
of my dissertation is then the nationality of these foreign-born workers. In this regard, Table
3.2 reports the 10 nationalities with the highest number of immigrants in Italy. It can be seen
Table 3.2: Immigrants by nationality
Country Share
1. Romania 22.76% 6. Philippines 3.19%
2. Albania 8.31% 7. India 3.04%
3. Marocco 8.15% 8. Bangladesh 2.79%
4. China 5.75% 9. Egypt 2.57%
5. Ukrain 2.40% 10. Pakistan 2.40%
Observations 5,306,548
Notes: Personal elaboration of Istat data, updated to the 1st January
2020. Immigrants are all people without Italian citizenship. Shares are
computed as number of immigrants of a nationality to the total number
of observations.
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Table 3.3: Immigrants and population distribution by age
Age Immigrants Population







Notes: Data taken from http://demo.istat.it/. Only individuals in the working age are consid-
ered (16-74 years old). Immigrants are all individuals without Italian citizenship.
that Romanians are by far the most represented nationality (accounting for almost one quar-
ter of foreign-born residents), while other immigrants mainly come from former Communist
countries, African countries overlooked on the Mediterranean Sea and East Asia developing
countries. It is clear that none of the immigrants coming from one of these countries of origin
has Italian as her mother tongue, and actually just a negligible amount (0.6%) of the total num-
ber of foreigners has born in a nation in which Italian is an official language4. At this point,
the unique possible issue concerning language proficiency may actually arise from the fact that
the large share of Romanian immigrants in the country is explained by the belonging of Ro-
manian and Italian to the same linguistic family, impling some similarities between the two.
However, these languages are not the same and it is more realistic to think that, given this fact,
Romanians have a comparative advantage on other immigrants rather than that they don’t have
a disadvantage with respect to Italians. Given all these considerations, I am quite confident in
concluding that the aforementioned assumption holds in the Italian labor market, at least for
those immigrants that have not attended school in the country5.
Focusing on characteristics more related to the labor market, Del Boca and Venturini (2005)
find that Italian immigration is mainly characterized by young and low-skilled individuals. In
this regards, Table 3.3 compares the distribution of immigrants and the whole population by
age, considering only individuals between 16 and 74 years old. As can be seen, almost 65% of
immigrants have an age below 45 years old, whereas only 44% of the entire population does.
Another interesting fact is that only 4.47% of immigrants is aged 65 years or more, whereas
more than 15% of natives are in the same age group. These results are clearly a consequence of
4These nations are namely: San Marino, Città del Vaticano, Malta and also some parts of Switzerland, Slovenia
and Croatia.
5However, unlike the other papers on the argument which use more detailed data, I am not able to distinguish
recent and non-recent immigrants.
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Table 3.4: Immigrants and natives distribution by education level
Age ≥ 15 15 ≤ Age ≤ 34
Educational Level Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
Elementary school Diploma or less 16.71% 10.44% 0.68% 6.96%
Middle school Diploma 31.34% 44.58% 33.07% 52.03%
High school Diploma 36.64% 33.97% 48.14% 32.21%
College degree 15.30% 11.01% 18.11% 8.79%
Observations 47,787,470 4,205,952 10,893,174 1,510,991
Notes: Personal elaboration of Istat data, updated to the 1st January 2020. Immigrants are all individuals without Italian citizenship.
the fact that immigration in Italy is a recent phenomenon: people, indeed, tend to migrate when
they are young and since this phenomenon began to be huge just 40 years ago in this country, it
is normal that the share of foreigners in the oldest cohorts is very low. Given this distribution of
foreign-born individuals by age, it is likely that will be the younger cohorts those most affected
by the immigrants-induced competition.
Table 3.4, instead, reports the distribution of immigrants and natives divided by educational
level. Considering all the individuals with an age above 15 years old, immigrants seem to be less
educated than Italians, but the difference is really slight. In particular, 15.30% of natives owns
a college degree, whereas 11% of immigrants does. Moreover, natives have also a greater share
of individuals with a high school diploma, though they show a larger share of individuals with
an elementary school diploma or less too. This is clearly due to the fact that this definition of
natives includes also very old cohorts, which probably have attended school when mandatory
educational attainment was very short, whereas I have previously shown that immigrants are
heavily more concentrated in more recent ones. For these reasons, I perform the same analysis
considering only individuals with an age between 15 and 34 years old. As I expected, natives
significantly improve their educational levels, whereas those of immigrants remain quite sta-
ble (if not even worse). Natives show a share of high-skilled individuals more than twice as
larger as that of immigrants, and also among low-skilled the former report an educational level
significantly higher than the latter.
Obviously, all the data seen so far refer only to regular immigrants, but illegal immigration is
also a widespread phenomenon in Italy. On the 1st January 2014, 350 thousands of individuals
were estimated to be irregularly present on Italian territory, while just 4 years later this number
dramatically rose to 533 thousands6. Indeed, those years have been an incredible period of
6Source: https://www.ismu.org/chiarimenti-numero-immigrati-irregolari/
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illegal immigration, especially through the Mediterranean Sea: from 2014 to 2019, 659,588
people landed on Italian coasts. Even though irregular, many of these immigrants actually
have a job, in particular in the agricultural sector or as domestic workers and caretakers7. This
situation may affect my estimation of the effect of immigration on the task specialization of
natives because illegal immigrants are not actually considered in the computation of the share
of immigrants in a specific area but, since they could be employed in some kinds of job, they
represent an effective supply shock in that local labor market.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Istat Labour Force Survey
My main dataset for this research is the Labor Force Survey (“Rilevazione delle Forze di La-
voro” in Italian) provided by the Italian National Bureau of Statistic (Istat). The LFS is a con-
tinuous survey which collects data of a sample composed of people with an age of at least 15
years and the other components of their families, on a quarterly base. It is useful for my analysis
since it provides data about the main aggregates of the labour market (occupational status, type
of job, work experience, etc.), disaggregated by the main socio-demographic characteristics8.
Unfortunately, Istat does not provide non-public datasets to students, so that the only data
in which the province of residence of the individual (a fundamental variable that I will use
later for my specifications) is available are those starting from 2014. As a consequence, I am
forced to use cross-sectional LFS for the period 2014-2019 for my purpose. Merging these
datasets I obtain more than 2 million observations. However, since I am interested only in those
individuals who have a job (and for which I should be able to measure the relative supply of
communication tasks), I drop individuals not in the working-age (i.e. below 16 years old and
above 74 years old) and those unable to work or temporarily unemployed. At this point, what I
have is a database of 774,216 observations.
3.2.2 O*Net Database
The LFS database provides a lot of interesting information about the occupations and the most
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whether immigration pushes natives towards more communicative-intensive jobs, I need spe-
cific data about the skill-content of their diverse occupations. For this purpose, the most helpful
source of data is undoubtedly the O*NET Database provided by the U.S. Department of Labor9.
The Occupational Information Network (O*NET) is a free online “database of occupational
characteristics and worker requirements information across the U.S. economy”10. For each job,
it provides a plethora of information such as workers requirements (i.e. skills, knowledge and
education required to perform the job), workers characteristics (i.e. abilities, interests and values
needed to perform the job), experience requirements (i.e. the training and licensing level needed
for the work), the job requirements (i.e. the work activities and context involved in the job) and
other information about the labour market of the different jobs (e.g. the occupational outlook
and the salaries). I create my measure of job task-intensities using the O*NET survey related
to the abilities required by each job. This dataset assigns a numerical value between 1 and 5
to describe the importance of 52 distinct employee abilities for each of the 968 occupations
defined by O*NET. Since these measurements are based on U.S. labor market characteristics,
I use them under the assumption that occupations in the United States and in Italy are not that
different with regards to their manual as opposed to communicative task content.
Table A1 in the Appendix lists each of these 52 O*NET variables and organizes them into
the categories that I will use to construct the manual and communication supply indices. For
comparability reasons, I follow Peri and Sparber (2009) and construct both a “basic” and an “ex-
tended” definition of manual and communicative abilities. In the basic definition, the manual
intensity index is computed by averaging just those abilities involving “movement and strength”
while the communication intensity one considers only measures related to, both oral and writ-
ten, expression and comprehension. Under the extended definition instead, the manual intensity
index includes also “sensory and perception” abilities (such as measures of general, visual and
hearing perceptions), while the communication intensity index adds also “cognitive and ana-
lytical” and “vocal” abilities to those already used in the basic definition. As explained by the
aforementioned authors, the basic definitions are preferable since they fit better the notion of
manual and communicative abilities. However, allocating O*NET abilities variables into a sim-
ple manual versus communicative job requirements categorization implies a series of arbitrary
choices and then performing my analysis with both these definitions can be used as a robustness
check for the validity of such a framework.
Unfortunately, the O*NET database classifies the different professions using a personalized




Table 3.5: Occupations and relative task intensities
Comm. Manual Share of
intensity intensity C/M imm. in
Occupation (2-digit ISCO08-code) index index index workforce
a) Four occupations with the highest communication/manual intensity
24. Business and administration professionals 0.960 0.431 1 1.05%
26. Legal, Social and Cultural Professional 0.997 0.473 0.980 3.25%
12. Administrative and commercial managers 0.972 0.453 0.961 2.70%
41. General and keyboard clerks 0.941 0.464 0.913 1.24%
b) Four occupations with the lowest communication/manual intensity
81. Stationary plant and machine operators 0.713 0.958 0.335 14.77%
93. Labourers in mining, construction,
manufacturing and transport 0.694 0.940 0.333 20.88%
91. Cleaners and helpers 0.618 0.838 0.331 36.98%
92. Agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers 0.690 1 0.309 30.94%
Notes: Personal elaboration based on O*NET task definitions and LFS data for the period 2014-2019. Basic definitions of both manual
and communication intensity indices are used. Basic definition of manual intensity index consists of the average of 19 O*NET variables
that capture the intensity of physical abilities, while the basic definition of communication intensity index is the average of 4 variable
measuring oral and written comprehension and expression. More detail about the construction are in the Appendix. Indices are normal-
ized so that they can reach at most a value of 1. The share of immigrants in the workforce is computed as the number of non-Italian
workers over the total number of workers in a specific occcupation, using LFS data for my period of analysis.
codification, which is inevitably inconsistent with that used by Istat. Through the use of ade-
quate crosswalks11, I converted this particular occupation classification into the 3-digit ISCO-08
codes, the one used in the Istat LFS. After this procedure, I compute the communication and
manual-intensity indices as well as their ratio for each job. As already said, the O*NET abili-
ties measures assume only values between 1 and 5. In order to account for this rather arbitrary
range of values, I rescale these three indices by dividing each of them by the respective max-
imum value of the index, so that they can reach at most the value of 1. Finally, I merge the
O*NET abilities database with the Italian LFS.
Table 3.5 reports the four occupations with the highest and the lowest C/M index using
2-digit ISCO-08 codes, in order to have a broader representation of jobs. To obtain that, I
aggregated the 3-digit codes through a weighted average, where the weights are given by the
number of workers in the LFS employed in each job. As it can be seen, all the occupations
11Firstly, I created a crosswalk which converts O*NET-SOC19 codes to SOC2018 codes (crosswalk
available at https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1IeKxFmXc9AEl8lO3_oUIdNciQB20cYUn?usp=
sharing); secondly, I converted SOC2018 codes into SOC2010 codes using the crosswalk provided
by U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and available at https://www.bls.gov/soc/2018/crosswalks_
used_by_agencies.htm; lastly, I converted the SOC2010 codes into 4-digit ISCO-08 codes using the
crosswalk used also by Hardy et al. (2018) and available at https://ibs.org.pl/en/resources/
occupation-classifications-crosswalks-from-onet-soc-to-isco/ and then I collapse them into the
3-digit ISCO-08 codes, which is the classification of occupations used in the Istat LFS.
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- Elementary school diploma or less 2.87% 8.34%
- Middle school diploma 27.86% 39.94%
- High school diploma 47.64% 40.21%
- College degree 21.52% 11.50%
Age (mean) 45.39 41.35
Relative task intensity index CM (mean) 0.536 0.382
Relative task intensity index CM (std. dev.) (0.204) (0.132)
Observations 697,037 77,179
Notes: Personal elaboration of data from Istat LFS in the period 2014-2019 and O*NET abilities
survey.
with the highest C/M index require a high level of language proficiency, since the interaction
with colleagues and clients, as well as a good knowledge of laws and other national rules,
represent fundamental components in their execution. On the other hand, the four occupations
with the lowest C/M index are all extremely physical and moreover do not demand specific
intellectual capabilities. The results of Table 3.5 are extremely important since they corroborate
my definitions of communicative and manual-intensity indices as good proxies for the supply
of communicative and manual tasks by the individuals.
Furthermore, in the last column of the table, I report the share of immigrants on the to-
tal number of workers performing each of those occupations. Considering that in the Italian
LFS the percentage of immigrant workers between 16 and 75 years old is about 10%, it is
clear that manual-intensive jobs attract a relatively greater number of foreign-born workers than
communicative-intensive ones, which is another result in line with what I expected.
3.2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.6 shows some descriptive statistics about the individuals in my sample of analysis,
discriminated between natives and immigrants. In my data, immigrants are significantly less
educated than Italians: in fact, almost 50% of them have at most a middle school diploma
against 30% of Italians; the latter show also a higher percentage of high school (48% vs. 40%)
and college graduates (22% vs. 12%). As in the population, immigrants are also younger than
natives and more precisely they are on average younger by 4 years. As far as the kind of occu-
pation is concerned instead, another important insight of the table is that immigrants are clearly
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Table 3.7: Some province-year cell descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Share of immigrants 8.84% 3.25% 1.15% 18.40%
Relative task intensity index CM 0.514 0.023 0.456 0.591
Unemp. rate 11.91% 5.95 2.89% 31.45%
Pop. density (pop/km2) 263 380 0.324 2653
GDP level in 2014 (in million Euro) 15,018 22,265 963 160,166
Mean wage (in Euro) 1287 90.68 931 1533
Share of workers in industry 26.26% 8.92% 8.98% 51.17%
Share of workers in services 68.27% 7.86% 46.65% 86.16%
Observations 648
Notes: Personal elaboration of data from different database: data concering share of immigrants, unemployment rate and
population density come from Istat online databse; data about GDP level in 2014 come from Eurostat online databse;
data about mean wage, share of worker employed in industry sector and share of workers employed in services sector are
personal computation based on Istat LFS from 2014 to 2019; data concerning relative task intensity index are personal
computation based on O*NET abilities survey.
employed in jobs relatively less communicative-intensive than natives, as can be seen from
the fact that the average CM is lower for the former than for the latter. Moreover, the standard
deviation of this particular variable is lower for immigrants, implying that they are more con-
centrated in manual-intensive occupations, whereas natives seem to be more widespread along
the occupational spectrum.
The dataset contains also a group of variables, measured at the province level, which are
useful to analyze how local labor markets differ among each other during my period of analy-
sis. The most important variable to consider is obviously the share of immigrants in a province,
which on average is 8.84%. However, as already seen in Section 3.1, immigrants follow a
distribution very different from that of natives and this fact is reflected also by the enormous
difference between the minimum and the maximum value of the variable: in 2014 the province
of Medio Campidano in Sardegna has a share of immigrants of just 1.15%, whereas in the
province of Prato in 2019 this share was 18.40%. This great heterogeneity among local labor
markets is highlighted also by the other variables reported and, in particular, this contrast is ex-
tremely significant between the North and the South of the country. As regards unemployment,
for example, if I consider only North and Central Italy the average unemployment rate among
local labor markets is 8.34%, whereas in South Italy this rate is 18.22%. The same pattern can
be seen analyzing the composition of the workforce by sector of employment: in northern and
central local labor markets on average the 30% of the workers are employed in the industry
sector, while in the South only 20% do, since agricultural and services sectors (especially the
public one) have in fact a relatively higher weight in the latter (Istat, 2019).
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Figure 3.2: Share of immigrants and relative C/M task supply of all natives
At this point, a first rough analysis can be done, using the individual relative communicative
tasks supply and looking at whether a correlation with the share of immigrants in the province
of the individual exists. Figure 3.2 depicts the scatter plot for all natives where on the x-axis is
represented the logarithm of the normalized C/M index and on the y-axis is the share of immi-
grants in the province. The red line depicts the fitted values line of the regression between these
two variables. As can be seen, this line is upward-sloping, showing the presence of a positive
correlation between the share of immigrants in a province and the supply of communicative to
manual tasks by the individuals in that area (specifically, the correlation is 0.05). However, the
fundamental lesson from econometrics is that correlation does not imply causality. Therefore,
this primitive analysis should be taken with a grain of salt.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
I have concluded my theoretical analysis in Chapter 2 by explaining the two key equilibrium
conditions of the model, expressed by Equations (2.11) and (2.12). These equations demon-
strate that theoretically a relationship between the share of immigrants and the workers’ relative
supply of tasks in a local labor market exists. Following the example of Peri and Sparber (2009),























The dependent variables of these regressions, CDMD and
C
M , are the relative supply of com-
municative versus manual skills provided by native (“domestic”) workers and in the local la-
bor market, respectively, while the share of immigrants in the local labor market ( fpt) rep-
resents my variable of interest. In Equation (3.1), γ is defined as −(1/
[︁
(1 − ρ)θL + ρ
]︁
)(ρ/
(1 − ρ)) × (∂ln(ζ/µ)/∂ f ). According to Prediction 7, I will expect this coefficient to be posi-
tive since an increase in the share of immigrants in the labor market causes natives to specialize
themselves into more communicative-intensive jobs in order to escape the increased immigrant-
induced competition. In Equation (3.2), instead, γTOT ≡ (θL/
[︁
(1 − ρ)θL + ρ
]︁
) × (∂ln(ζ/µ)/∂ f ).
The sign of this coefficent, however, is more difficult to determine a priori: as shown in Figure
2.4, the theorethical model forecasts a negative effect of immigration on the aggregate relative
supply of communicative tasks in the economy, due to the bigger suppy of manual skills pro-
vided by immigrants. But what is represented in Figure 2.4 is just a partial equilibrium: the
model developed by Peri and Sparber (2009) does not allow the natives’ supply curve to move
in response to the increasing competition; if instead natives react to immigration by augment-
ing their relative supply of communicative tasks regardless of the wage level (for example, by
increasing ζD/µD) and then shifting their supply curve towards right, a positive effect is actually
possible. Besides, each regression contains both time (αDt , α
TOT
t ) and province fixed effects (α
D
p ,
αDp ). The former account for possible common time-varying technologial parameters and repre-
sent the term (ρθL/
[︁
(1 − ρ)θL + ρ
]︁
)× ln((1−βL)/βL) from Equations (2.11) and (2.12); the latter,
instead, account for variation due to unobserved characteristics of the population, including the
term (1/(1 − ρ)) × ln(ζD/µD). Finally, εDpt and ε
TOT
pt represent the noncorrelated zero-mean error
terms of the regressions.
Unfortunately, there are two basic differences between my data and those used by Peri and
Sparber (2009), which significantly undermine my possibility of successfully implement such
specifications. The first one is that Peri and Sparber (2009) exploit U.S. Census data for their
analysis, so that their database coincides with the American population, whereas the Italian
LFS is by construction just a representative sample. On this ground, my dependent variables
would inevitably suffer from sample variability in these regressions since they would not be
exact measures of the relative commuicative task supply in each province-year cell, but just
estimates that would be significantly affected by the observations composing each specific sub-
sample. This could be a minor problem if the LFS sample is well-constructed, since in that case
also the observations in each cell should consequently be a representation of the population of
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that specific province in that specific year, so that even if subjected to sample variability those
estimates should be on average equal to the actual value. However, as I have explained in Sec-
tion 3.2.1, for the purposes of this dissertation I am forced to operate a series of “cuts” to my
starting database and therefore there is no certainty that, after these operations, the observations
which remain in each cell are actually representative of the real population in that subgroup. As
a consequence, there are no evidence that aggregating individual task supplies I actually obtain
a non-distorted value of my indices and hence the best solution is running these regression with
the dependent variable measured at the individual level.
The second issue instead is connected with the instrumental variable, which will be ex-
plained in the next section. In a few words, running the first stage regression including province
fixed effects, my instrument is not statistically correlated with the share of immigrants in a local
labor market (my dependent variable), a result that is quite strange. The problem seems to be
that the province fixed effects capture all the variability in the actual share of immigrants, mak-
ing all the other variables not statistically significant. To solve this problem, I decide then to
run the first stage regessions including fixed effects at the region level and then controlling for
some province characteristics that should be rather constant over time. In particular, I control
for the unemployment rate, the population density, the GDP level in 2014, the mean wage and
the share of workers employed in both the industry and the services sector in the province12.
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where X′ is a set of individual controls (and specifically it includes a dummy for the gender
of the individual, a dummy for each decennial age group13 and a dummy for each education
level14), αr are the region fixed effects, while W ′ is the set of province controls previously de-
12Data relative to unemployment rate and the population density are from http://dati.istat.it; data
about the GDP level in 2014 are from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database; data related to
mean wage, share of workers employed in the industry sector and share of workers employed in the services sector
are personal elaborations of the Istat LFS.
13The regression includes 5 dummies corresponding to 5 different age groups: 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-
74 years old. Stata automatically drops the dummy corresponding to the 16-24 years old age group for collinearity
problems.
14Regressions in which all natives are considered include 5 dummies corresponding to 5 different education
levels: ”Elementary school diploma”, ”Middle school diploma”, ”3-years high-school diploma”, ”5-years high
school diploma” and ”College degree”. Regressions which consider low-educated natives only include 4 dummies,
that are the aforementioned but obviously ”College degree”. Stata automatically drops ”No title” dummmy for
collinearity problems.
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scribed. Moreover, for each equation, I also evaluate if immigration has a stronger relationship
with the average supply of manual (MD) or communicative (CD) tasks of the natives by estimat-
ing the following specifications:










Just as a matter of comparability, I implement also the counterparts of Equation (3.1) and
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To take into account the different dimensions of the Italian provinces, in these last two equations
I use WLS, with weights given by the number of observations in each province-year cell.
As already explained in Chapter 2, another major issue related to specifications based on
a “spatial approach” is that the assumption that local labor markets are closed is rather weak.
Workers and firms are actually completely free to move across Italian provinces in response
to a labor supply shocks and this fact may significantly lower the estimate of the effect of
immigration on task specialization of natives. In this regards, Venturini and Villosio (2006)
report some data telling that internal mobility across provinces is very limited in Italy. In this
dissertation, since there is no availability of data to construct a measure of the net migration rate
at the province level which considers only natives to include in my specifications, I solve this
problem by dropping all the observations in the Italian LFS who had changed their province of
residence in the previous year for work-related reasons (9,101 individuals out of 783,317).
3.3.1 Instrumental variable
A second important problem I have previously talked about is the fact that immigrants are not
randomly distributed among local labor markets. More precisely, in my research context it could
be the case that unobserved province-specific technology and demand factors have affected the
productivity of communicative-intensive jobs, inducing natives to change their occupation and
in turn attracting immigrants into a local labour market. These elements are therefore included
in the error term (ε) and make my variable of interest potentially endogenous.
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In these situations, the most common way to get rid of the endogeneity problem (and the
related distortion in the OLS estimator) is to rely on an Instrumental Variable strategy (IV),
and in particular I will use the Two-Stage Least Square procedure (2SLS). In the immigration
economics literature, the most used instrument is by far the so-called “past settlement” or “en-
clave” instrument (Jaeger et al., 2018). This instrument exploits the fact that immigrants have
been observed to have the tendency of settling in those cities in which the presence of foreigners
is already large. Altonji and Card (1991) were the first to use this specific kind of shift-share in-
strument to identify the causal effects of immigrants on natives’ labor market outcomes by using
only the geographic distribution of all immigrants. Later, Card (2001) refined the instrument
by exploiting not simply the fact that immigrants choose to live where other immigrants are,
but more specifically that they look for other immigrants from the same country of origin. In










where Fopt0/Fpt0 is the share of immigrants from the country of origin o in local labor market p
at time t0 (which is a time before t), Fot is the number of immigrants from that country of origin
at time t at the national level and Lpt is the total population in the local labour market p at time
t. In other words, the expected share of immigrants in a local labor market is computed as if the
actual number of immigrants from each country of origin in the country would have the same
distribution among local labor markets that it had in a sufficient distant point in time. In this
context, the choice of each foreign-born worker does not depend on the economic outcomes or
specific labor demand shocks, but only on the presence of other workers from the same country
in the province.
The great appeal of this instrument is that it computes immigration shares at the local level
by exploiting the number of immigrants at the national level, which are supposedly less en-
dogenous with regards to local conditions. However, the exogeneity of the national immigrants
level to province-specific labor conditions is not a warranty of the fact that the instrument is
uncorrelated with the error term and then meets the exclusion restriction. In fact, Equation (3.9)
is not only a function of Fot but also of the local immigrant shares Fopt0/Fpt0: if the latter are
correlated with such labor market conditions, even if the former are exogenous, the instrument
cannot be considered as a valid one. This could be the case if local demand shocks are serially
correlated, leading to a correlation between the immigrant shares used in the construction of the
instrument and subsequent demand shocks. But this kind of issue can be easily addressed by
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choosing settlement patterns that are sufficiently lagged.
As regards the choice of the lag, I use the year 2003 as t0 for the creation of my shift-share
instrument for the period 2014-2019. 2003 is the first year for which Istat provides data about
foreigners disaggregated by province and country of origin15 and therefore it is the moment most
distant in time from my period of analysis. Furthermore, 2003 predates the enlargements of the
European Union towards some former communists Eastern Europe countries (including Poland,
Bulgaria and above all Romania) which happened in 2004 and 2007 and allowed immigrants
from these countries to freely enter the Italian labor market. These relevant historical changes
may indicate that past and current shocks are unlikely to be correlated, supporting the validity
of the exclusion restriction.
Unfortunately, the choice of a lag sufficiently distant in time has not only advantages. In
2001 and 2004, two major reforms established 7 new provinces which become operative only
in 2005 and 2009 respectively, so that the number of provinces in 2003 and 2014-2019 were
not coincident. These 7 new territories were actually formed through the detachment of some
municipalities from the territory of other provinces16. Since these new territories did not exist in
2003, I don’t have data about immigrants in these provinces in order to compute the “share” part
of the instrument (Fopt0/Fot0). Luckily, Istat provides data on the total population by province
for the period 2002-2010 which are built on the base of the 2011 Census data. In these data,
the new provinces are considered, so that an estimate of the population of these provinces in
2003 is actually available. Using these data, I am able to impute the number of immigrants
by country of origin to the new provinces. For example, I know that in 2003 the provinces
of Medio-Campidano and Carbonia-Iglesias (if operative) would have counted for about 13%
and 17% of the population of the “old” province of Cagliari, so that the future “new” province
of Cagliari (the one exisiting since 2005) would have accounted for the remaining 70%. Using
these weights, I am able to divide the immigrants of the “old” province of Cagliari disaggregated
by country of origin among the three provinces corresponding to that territory in 2014 and
also to compute the “share” part of the instrument for all the other new provinces existing in
2014, in the same way. In 2017, however, a further reform occurred by which the province of
Olbia-Tempio returned under the jurisdiction of the province of Sassari, while the province of
15Source: http://dati.istat.it/
16In particular: the province of Monza-Brianza was created with municipalities all coming from the province of
Milano, the province of Fermo with municipalities from the province of Ascoli-Piceno, the province of Barletta-
Andria-Trani with municipalities from the province of Bari, the province of Ogliastra with municipalities from
the province of Nuoro, and the provinces of Carbonia-Iglesias and Medio-Campidano with municipalities of the
province of Cagliari. The last new province, Olbia-Tempio, was actually formed with 24 municipalities from the
province of Sassari and 2 municipalities from the province of Nuoro; I consider this new province as a former part
only of the province of Sassari.
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Table 3.8: First stage regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fi jt fi jt f jt f jt
f̃ jt 0.405*** 0.406*** 0.405*** 0.406***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054)
Ind. controls Yes Yes No No
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 58.67 56.74 58.59 56.57
Observations 697,037 774,216 648 648
R2 0.905 0.904 0.905 0.904
Notes: Dependent variables in the first row. The explanatory variable is the shift-share instrument
computed with 2003 as base year. Specification (1) and (2) use individuals as observational data.
The dependent variable in these specification is the share of immigrants each individual faces in
her province-year cell. Specification (3) and (4) use province-year cells as observational units. In
these specifications, the dependent variable is the share of immigrants in the province-year cell and
the coefficients are computed with WLS, using the number of observations in each province-year
cell as weights. Specification (1) and (3) includes only native individuals, whereas specification (2)
and (4) includes both native and foreign-born individuals. Individual controls include a dummy for
the sex of the individual, a dummy for each decennial age group and a dummy for each education
level. Province controls include the unemployment rate, the population density, the Gdp in 2014,
the mean wage, the share of workers employed in the industry sector and the share of workers em-
ployed in the services sectro in each province-year cell. Region and year fixed effects are included
in all specifications. Standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parenthesis.
*, **, ***: coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Ogliastra returned to be part of the province of Nuoro. Moreover, the territory of the provinces
of Cagliari, Medio-Campidano and Carbonia-Iglesias was split into two provinces (Cagliari and
Sud-Sardegna) without following any previous border among these provinces. For simplicity,
since this territory coincides with the province of Cagliari existing in 2003 (for which I know the
distribution of immigrants by country of origin), I consider these two provinces as one starting
from 201717.
For the computation of the instrument, I used all the 187 nationalities that were present in
Italy in 200318.
Before using the instrument for my analysis purposes, I test whether it meets the relevance
condition by running the first-stage regressions (Table 3.8). Column (1) and Column (2) show
coefficients of regressions related to Equation (3.3) and Equation (3.4) respectively, whereas
17In this way I have 4 provinces (Medio-Campidano, Carbonia-Iglesias, Ogliastra and Olbia-Tempio) with only
3 observations in the period 2014-2019. The remaining 106 Italian provinces (even if some of these with different
extension) are observed for the entire period, summing up to 648 observations.
18In this case too, I have little discrepancies in the classification of immigrants by country of origin between
2003 and 2014-2019: in fact, in 2014-2019 database I consider Serbia, Montenegro and Kosowo as Serbia and
Montenegro, and “Recognized non-citizens (Latvia)” together with Latvia.
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Column (3) and (4) show those related to Equation (3.7) and (3.8). The results for these specifi-
cations are similar since the unique difference between the two pair of regression is the introduc-
tion of the controls related to the individual characteristics, which obviously have a negligible
effect on the share of immigrants. As it can be seen, with these specifications the endogenous
variable and the instrument always show a positive and statistically significant at the 1% level
relationship, both in the regressions which use individual and those which use province-year
cells as observational units. The coefficients do not change also by considering immigrants, as
well as natives, as I did in Columns (2) and (4). Moreover, all the F-statistics are by far above
the typical threshold of 10 suggested by Stock et al. (2002) and therefore the instrument can be
considered not weak.
Given these results, I can conclude that the instrument is for sure relevant. However, this
might be also a problem in the case of a shift-share instrument, since as analyzed by Jaeger et al.
(2018) “[i]f the instrument is “too strong” it is highly unlikely to meet the exclusion restriction
for a valid instrument and actually separate the endogenous component of the immigrant inflows
from the exogenous component. The flipside of this argument is that the prospects to satisfy
the exclusion restriction may be better in settings in which the first-stage link is weaker because
immigrant inflows have been less stable over time”. However, this is not my case since an
F-statistic of 50 is not large enough to consider the instrument “too strong” at all.
Chapter 4
Results
4.1 Immigration and the relative task supply of natives
In this section, I procede by testing the equilibrium condition expressed in Equation (2.11), that
is the effect of immigration on the relative supply of communicative tasks by natives ( CDMD ). To
do this, I estimate Equation (3.3) and (3.7), using both OLS and 2SLS and clustering standard
error by provinces. Moreover, for each regression, I also study whether immigration has a larger
effect on manual or communicative task supplies, by using specifications of the type shown in
Equation (3.5) and (3.6). For this first analysis, all the specifications use the basic definitions of
both communicative and manual intensity index, since they fit better the notions of this kind of
abilities1.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.1 present respectively the OLS and the 2SLS estimates of
δ, δM and δC, computed using data about native-born workers measured at the individual level
(697,037 observations). Looking at these coefficients, two results immediately leap to the eye.
First, the estimates of δ strongly confirm what theoretically predicted by Prediction 7, as the
coefficients are always positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level. In
particular, the OLS estimate suggests that a 1 percentage-point increase in the share of immi-
grants is associated with a 0.48 percent increase in the relative supply of communicative versus
manual tasks among natives. Second, this relative increase is mostly due to a decrease in the
supply of manual tasks, rather than to an increase in the supply of communicative skills. The
estimates of δM and δC in Column (1), in fact, show that the former counts for more than three
quarters of the value of δ, while the latter just for the remaining part. More precisely, a 1
percentage-point increase in the share of immigrants is associated with a 0.37 percent decrease
in the supply of manual tasks by Italian workers, whereas the same variation in the share of im-
1Table A1 in the Appendix shows the variables used for the creation of these different indices.
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Table 4.1: Effect on natives task supply (using basic definitions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator OLS IV WLS IV
ln( CDMD )
0.480*** 0.715*** 0.567*** 1.285***
(0.102) (0.149) (0.129) (0.218)
ln(MD)
- 0.367*** - 0.552*** - 0.428*** - 0.938***
(0.078) (0.104) (0.095) (0.144)
ln(CD)
0.113*** 0.163*** 0.139*** 0.347***
(0.031) (0.056) (0.039) (0.077)
Ind. controls Yes Yes No No
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.37 0.37 0.87 0.84
Observations 697,037 697,037 648 648
Notes: Each cell contains estimates from a separate regression. Only natives individual are considered.
Dependent variable is indicated in the first column. All regressions use the basic definitions of both com-
municative and manual indices. The explanatory variable is the share of immigrants in a province-year cell.
Columns (1) and (2) refer to regressions with the dependent variable measured at individual level. Region
and year fixed effects are included. In these specifications, the set of controls includes: a dummy for the sex
of the individual, a dummy for each education level, a dummy for each decennial age group; the average
wage, the population density, the unemployment rate, the share of workers employed in the industry sec-
tor and the share of workers employed in the services sector in the province-year cell of the individual; the
province GDP level in 2014. Columns (3) and (4) refer to regressions with the dependent variable measured
at province-year level (110 provinces in the period 2014-2016 and 106 provinces for the period 2017-2019,
for a total of 648 observations). Region and year fixed effects are included. In these specifications, the set
of controls includes: the average wage, the population density, the unemployment rate, the share of workers
employed in the industry sector and the share of workers employed in the services sector in a province-year
cell and the province GDP level in 2014. Specifications (1) use OLS estimator and Specification (3) use
WLS with weights given by the number of observations in each province-year cell. Specification (2) and (4)
use 2SLS using the shift-share instrument computed with 2003 as base year. Standard errors are clustered
at province level in all regressions. R2 refers to regressions in the first row.
*, **, ***: coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
migrants induces natives to increase their supply of communicative skills by just 0.11 percent.
Looking at Column (2), it can be seen that estimating the same coefficients with the 2SLS esti-
mator doesn’t change the sign and the significance of the results. All the coefficients, however,
become sensibly larger, evidencing a possible downward bias in the OLS estimates. In partic-
ular, when IV estimator is used, a 1 percent increase in the share of immigrants is associated
with a 0.72 percent increase in the natives’ relative supply of communicative tasks. Again, δM
is responsible for more than three quarters of the value of δ.
Column (3) and (4) are the counterparts of Column (1) and (2) where the dependent variable
is the average individual relative task supply in a province-year cell (Equation 3.7). As before,
estimates of γ both in Column (3) and Column (4) confirm the prediction of the theoretical
model. OLS estimation suggests that a rise by 1 percent in the share of immigrants in a province
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Table 4.2: Effects on aggregate task supply
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator OLS IV WLS IV
ln( CM )
0.227** 0.369*** 0.161 0.677***
(0.105) (0.140) (0.117) (0.174)
ln(M)
- 0.217*** - 0.345*** - 0.175** - 0.555***
(0.080) (0.100) (0.073) (0.117)
ln(C)
0.010 0.024 - 0.014 0.122*
(0.032) (0.052) (0.037) (0.067)
Ind. controls Yes Yes No No
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.35 0.35 0.86 0.84
Observations 774,216 774,216 648 648
Notes: Each cell contains estimates from a separate regression. Both immigrants and natives observations
are considered. Dependent variable is indicated in the first column. All regressions use the basic defini-
tions of both communicative and manual indices. The explanatory variable is the share of immigrants in a
province-year cell. Columns (1) and (2) refer to regressions with the dependent variable measured at indi-
vidual level. Region and year fixed effects are included. In these specifications, the set of controls includes:
a dummy for the sex of the individual, a dummy for each education level, a dummy for each decennial age
group; the average wage, the population density, the unemployment rate, the share of workers employed in
the industry sector and the share of workers employed in the services sector in the province-year cell of the
individual; the province GDP level in 2014. Columns (3) and (4) refer to regressions with the dependent
variable measured at province-year level (110 provinces in the period 2014-2016 and 106 provinces for the
period 2017-2019, for a total of 648 observations). Region and year fixed effects are included. In these
specifications, the set of controls includes: the average wage, the population density, the unemployment
rate, the share of workers employed in the industry sector and the share of workers employed in the services
sector in a province-year cell and the province GDP level in 2014. Specifications (1) uses OLS estimator
and specification (3) uses WLS with weights given by the number of observations in the province-year
cell. Specification (2) and (4) use 2SLS using the shift-share instrument computed with 2003 as base year.
Standard errors are clustered at province level in all regressions. R2 refers to regressions in first row.
*, **, ***: coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively
induces a rise in the average individual relative supply of communicative tasks by natives by
0.57% (a coefficient slightly greater than that in Column 1), whereas 2SLS estimation implies a
surprising increase by even 1.29 percent (an effect 80% greater than that estimated in Column
2). Again, the main driver of these increases is represented by a large drop in the average supply
of manual tasks by natives.
4.2 Immigration and the total relative task supply
Table 4.2, instead, reports the estimations of Equation (3.4) and (3.8), which evaluate the impact
of immigration on the total relative supply of communicative versus manual skills in the market
( CM ). Unlike the regressions in the previous section, these specifications use both natives and
immigrants observations, and not only the former. As before, I also analyze whether this effect
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is greater for communicative or manual tasks by running separate regression with ln(C) and
ln(M) as dependent variables.
Columns (1) and (2) corresponds to Equation (3.4) estimated using OLS and 2SLS, respec-
tively. As can be seen, the estimates of δTOT are positive and statistically significant. In partic-
ular, a one percent increase in the share of immigrants is associated with a rise in the relative
supply of communicative tasks by 0.22%, if the coefficient is estimated with OLS, or by 0.37%,
if the coefficient is estimated with 2SLS. This increase is almost fully explained by a drop in
the supply of manual tasks, whereas there is no statistically significant effect on the supply of
communicative tasks, since the coefficients have become basically zero. As regards regressions
corresponding to Equation (3.8) in Column (3) and (4) (those using province-year cells as units
of observation), the results are to some extent discordant. OLS estimation reports a positive but
not significant impact of immigration on the relative supply of communicative task in a local
labor market, whereas 2SLS estimation confirms the results of the previous regressions, found-
ing an even greater effect. However, these last regressions do not use my favorite specification,
as I have explained in Section 3.3, so that I decide to focus my attention on Column (1) and (2).
The outcomes of these two specifications are indeed undoubtedly interesting. The theoret-
ical model developed by Peri and Sparber (2009), in fact, forecasts a reduction in the market
relative supply of communicative skills in response to an increase in the number of foreign
workers. However, this is only a partial equilibrium, since the model does not allow native-
born supply curve to move after this immigration-induced shock in the labor market, so that the
unique possible reaction of natives is that caused by the variation in communicative-jobs com-
pensation (represented by a movement along the supply curve). The fact that my specifications
actually estimate an increase in the relative task supply at the market level, not only suggest
that natives change their task supply for reasons others than wage (and then that their supply
curve shifts rightwards), but also that their reaction to the increase in the share of immigrants




As previously analyzed in Section 3.1, the vast majority of immigrants in Italy is low-skilled.
Moreover, immigrants are used to suffer from “skill downgrading” (Dustmann et al., 2016),
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Table 4.3: Effects on relative task supply of low-skilled natives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator OLS 2SLS WLS 2SLS
ln( CDMD )
0.580*** 0.793*** 0.616*** 1.058***
(0.106) (0.157) (0.101) (0.167)
ln(MD)
- 0.446*** - 0.608*** - 0.474*** - 0.794***
(0.080) (0.110) (0.074) (0.111)
ln(CD)
0.134*** 0.185*** 0.141*** 0.264***
(0.035) (0.060) (0.036) (0.068)
Ind. controls Yes Yes No No
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.26 0.26 0.86 0.84
Observations 547,017 547,017 648 648
Notes: Each cell contains estimates from a separate regression. Only natives with no college degree are
considered. Dependent variable is indicated in the first column. All regressions use the basic definitions of
both communicative and manual indices. The explanatory variable is the share of immigrants in a province-
year cell. Columns (1) and (2) refer to regressions with the dependent variable measured at individual level.
Region and year fixed effects are included. In these specifications, the set of controls includes: a dummy
for the sex of the individual, a dummy for each education level, a dummy for each decennial age group;
the average wage, the population density, the unemployment rate, the share of workers employed in the
industry sector and the share of workers employed in the services sector in the province-year cell of the
individual; the province GDP level in 2014. Columns (3) and (4) refer to regressions with the dependent
variable measured at province-year level (110 provinces in the period 2014-2016 and 106 provinces for the
period 2017-2019, for a total of 648 observations). Region and year fixed effects are included. In these
specifications, the set of controls includes: the average wage, the population density, the unemployment
rate, the share of workers employed in the industry sector and the share of workers employed in the services
sector in a province-year cell and the province GDP level in 2014. Specifications (1) uses OLS estimator
and specification (3) use WLS with weights given by the number of observations in the province-year
cell. Specification (2) and (4) use 2SLS using the shift-share instrument computed with 2003 as base year.
Standard errors are clustered at province level in all regressions. R2 refers to regressions in the first row.
*, **, ***: coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively
so that even if immigrants own a college degree (and then they can be considered high-skilled
workers), they tend to be employed in low-skill jobs in the host country. In this context, it is
reasonable to affirm that the natives most affected by the competition of immigrants in their
local labor markets are the low-skilled ones.
To test this statement, I perform Equations (3.3), (3.5) and (3.6) using only low-skilled
natives as sample. Table 4.3 reports the results of these regressions. First, it can be seen that
the coefficients computed with this subsample confirm the results reached in Section 4.1: the
estimations of δ remain always positive and statistically significant at the 1% percent confidence
level; the 2SLS estimates are again bigger than the OLS estimates; and the drop in the natives’
supply of manual tasks counts for more than three quarters of the rise in natives relative supply
of communicative tasks.
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Comparing the results of Table 4.1 and Table 4.3 it is easy to see that in specifications that
use the relative task supply of the individual as dependent variable, the coefficients computed
including only low-skilled natives are to some extent higher than those computed considering
all natives as sample population. In particular, analyzing the 2SLS estimations, a 1% increase in
the share of immigrants was associated with a 0.72 percent increase in the relative task supply
when all natives were considered, whereas now the same coefficient is equal to 0.79 percent.
Instead, focusing the attention on the other specifications (where the dependent variable is the
average individual relative task supply in the province), the situation is quite different. The
coefficient in Table 4.3 actually becomes lower than its counterpart in Table 4.1, 1.06% and
1.29%, respectively. However, since for the reasons explained in Section 3.3, my preferred
specifications are those using the relative task supply measured at the individual level, I can
conclude that the effect of immigrants on task specialization is slightly greater among low-
skilled natives.
4.3.2 Young vs. old individuals
The analysis in Section 3.1 has also highlighted the fact that immigrants are not equally dis-
tributed among age cohorts. Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that, according to age,
some individuals suffer the immigrants-induced competition more than others. In particular,
data have shown that the great majority of foreigners (about 65%) has an age which is below 44
years old. For this reason, I divide my sample of natives using that particular age as discrimen
and I perform the specification expressed in Equation (3.3) for both these subsamples.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4.4. The first insight is that the estimates
of δ remain positive for both groups. However, the coefficient is clearly bigger for younger
observations than for older ones: more precisely, considering 2SLS estimations, a one percent
increase in the share of immigrants is associated with a 0.80% increase in the relative supply of
communicative skills if the individual is younger than 45 years old, and with a 0.67% increase,
if instead, the individual is older than that age. As already said, this result could be explained by
the fact that immigrants in Italy are more similar in production to the former group than to the
latter. But another factor could be also the great segmentation typical of the Italian labor market:
in the last decades, in fact, many governments had incentivized the use of more flexible types
of contract, which have created a sensible disparity in terms of employment protection and job
stability between who already was in and who instead was going to enter the labor market. It
follows that it is less costly for the younger cohorts to change their jobs and move towards more
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Table 4.4: Effects on young vs. old individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV
Group 16 ≤ Age ≤ 44 45 ≤ Age ≤ 74
ln( CDMD )
0.545*** 0.796*** 0.413*** 0.665***
(0.103) (0.171) (0.117) (0.157)
ln(MD)
- 0.400*** - 0.624*** - 0.332*** - 0.506***
(0.078) (0.123) (0.090) (0.114)
ln(CD)
0.145*** 0.173*** 0.081** 0.159***
(0.031) (0.061) (0.036) (0.061)
Ind. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.39
Observations 309,458 309,458 387,579 387,579
Notes: Each cell contains estimates from a separate regression. Only natives individual are considered.
Dependent variable is indicated in the first column. All regressions use the basic definitions of both com-
municative and manual indices. The explanatory variable is the share of immigrants in a province-year
cell. Columns (1) and (2) consider only native individuals with age below 45 years old. Region and year
fixed effects are included. In these specifications, the set of controls includes: a dummy for the sex of the
individual, a dummy for each education level, a dummy for each decennial age group (in the range 16-44
years old); the average wage, the population density, the unemployment rate, the share of workers employed
in the industry sector and the share of workers employed in the services sector in the province-year cell of
the individual; the province GDP level in 2014. Columns (3) and (4) consider only native individual with
an age above 44 years old. Region and year fixed effects are included. In these specifications, the set of
controls includes: a dummy for the sex of the individual, a dummy for each education level, a dummy for
each decennial age group (in the range 45-74 years old); the average wage, the population density, the un-
employment rate, the share of workers employed in the industry sector and the share of workers employed
in the services sector in a province-year cell and the province GDP level in 2014. Specifications (1) and
Specification (3) use OLS estimator. Specification (2) and (4) use 2SLS using the shift-share instrument
computed with 2003 as base year. Standard errors are clustered at province level in all regressions. R2 refers
to regressions in first row.
*, **, ***: coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
communicative-intensive occupations in response to an eventual detrimental effect due to the
arrival of new workers from abroad.
4.3.3 Macroregions
As already seen in Section 3.1, immigrants are not equally distributed among Italian macrore-
gions (North, Central and South Italy). Moreover, in Section 3.2.3, it has been also shown
that Italian provinces are very different in terms of unemployment rate, GDP and sector com-
position of the economy, highlighting how this discrepancy is especially evident between the
North-Cental and the Southern parts of the country.
For these reasons, it may be interesting to perform my analysis also dividing my sample
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Table 4.5: Effect on natives by macroregion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Macroregion North Center South
ln( CDMD )
0.563*** 0.757*** 0.713*** 0.947*** 0.211 -0.075











(0.094) (0.132) (0.088) (0.094) (0.126) (0.282)
ln(CD)
0.138*** 0.162** 0.181*** 0.276*** 0.057 0.020
(0.040) (0.069) (0.046) (0.089) (0.037) (0.078)
Ind. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.40
Observations 393,037 393,037 148,360 148,360 155,610 155,610
Notes: Each cell contains estimates from a separate regression. Only natives individaul are considered. Dependent variable is indicated
in the first column. All regressions use the basic definitions of both communicative and manual indeces. The explanatory variable is the
share of immigrants in a province-year cell. All specifications refer to regressions with the dependent variable measured at individual level.
Region and year fixed effects are included. Individual controls includes: a dummy for the sex of the individual, a dummy for each education
level, a dummy for each decennial age group; province controls includes: the average wage, the population density, the unemployment rate,
the share of workers employed in the industry sector and the share of workers employed in the services sector in the province-year cell of the
individual; the province GDP level in 2014. Specifications (1) and (2) consider only Northern regions (Valle d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria,
Lombardia, Trentino Alto-Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and Emilia-Romagna). Specifications (3) and (4) consider only Central
regions (Marche, Toscana Umbria and Lazio). Specification (5) and (6) consider only Southern regions (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania,
Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna). Specifications (1),(3) and (5) use OLS estimator. Specification (2),(4) and (6) use 2SLS
using the shift-share instrument computed with 2003 as base year. Standard errors are clustered at province level in all regressions. R2
refers to regressions in the first row.
*, **, ***: coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
following this specific geographical distinction. Table 4.5 reports the results of this investiga-
tion. As can be seen, regressions concerning North and Central Italy confirm the conclusions
of my principal analysis. The effect of immigration on the relative supply of communication
tasks by natives is still positive and the coefficients have a similar magnitude of those in Table
4.1. In particular, when the share of immigrant increase by 1%, natives rise their relative supply
of communicative versus manual tasks by 0.76% and 0.95%, respectively in the North and the
Center of the country. As far as South Italy is concerned, however, coefficients approaches zero
(and in fact become even negative in the 2SLS specification) and the effect become no longer
significant.
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Table 4.6: Effect on natives task supply (using extended definitions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)





)︃ 0.291*** 0.446*** 0.352*** 0.834***




)︂ - 0.251*** - 0.379*** - 0.289*** - 0.621***




)︂ 0.040 0.067 0.062** 0.213***
(0.028) (0.481) (0.031) (0.065)
Ind. controls Yes Yes No No
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.39 0.39 0.87 0.84
Observations 697,037 697,037 648 648
Notes: Each cell contains estimates from a separate regression. Only natives indivuals are considered.
Dependent variable is indicated in the first column. All regressions use the extended definitions of both
communicative and manual indeces. The explanatory variable is the share of immigrants in a province-year
cell. Columns (1) and (2) refer to regressions with the dependent variable measured at individual level.
Region and year fixed effects are included. In these specifications, the set of controls includes: a dummy
for the sex of the individual, a dummy for each education level, a dummy for each decennial age group;
the average wage, the population density, the unemployment rate, the share of workers employed in the
industry sector and the share of workers employed in the services sector in the province-year cell of the
individual; the province GDP level in 2014. Columns (3) and (4) refer to regressions with the dependent
variable measured at province-year level (110 provinces in the period 2014-2016 and 106 provinces for the
period 2017-2019, for a total of 648 observations). Region and year fixed effects are included. In these
specifications, the set of controls includes: the average wage, the population density, the unemployment
rate, the share of workers employed in the industry sector and the share of workers employed in the services
sector in a province-year cell and the province GDP level in 2014. Specifications (1) use OLS estimator
and specification (3) use WLS with weights given by the number of observations in the province-year
cell. Specification (2) and (4) use 2SLS using the shift-share instrument computed with 2003 as base year.
Standard errors are clustered at province level in all regressions. R2 refers to regressions in first row.
*, **, ***: coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
4.4 Robustness check
4.4.1 Extended definitions of manual and communicative indices
The choice of O*NET variables to include in the creation of the manual and communication
indices is arbitrary and therefore my results could be affected by this fact. Following Peri and
Sparber (2009), I create also two alternative definitions of these indices, which can be defined as
“extended”: the extended definition of the manual-intensity index adds to the abilities related to
dexterity, coordination and strength also those related to hearing, visual and general perception;
the extended definition of the communicative-intensity index instead includes, as well as oral
and written comprehension abilities, also cognitive, analytical and vocal-related ones (see Table
A1 in the Appendix).
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Table 4.7: Main effects excluding Romanian immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV
ln( CM )
0.500*** 0.813*** 0.276*** 0.478***
(0.128) (0.173) (0.125) (0.156)
ln(M)
- 0.388*** - 0.622*** - 0.262*** - 0.434***
(0.090) (0.121) (0.090) (0.110)
ln(C)
0.112*** 0.191*** 0.014 0.044
(0.041) (0.064) (0.038) (0.059)
Ind. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.35
Observations 697,037 697,037 774,216 774,216
Notes: Each cell contains estimates from a separate regression. Specifications (1) and (2) consider only
native individuals, specifications (3) and (4) consider both immigrant and native individuals. Dependent
variable is indicated in the first column. All regressions use the basic definitions of both communicative
and manual indices. The explanatory variable is the share of immigrants in a province-year cell excluding
the Romanian immigrants. Region and year fixed effects are included. In these specifications, the set of
controls includes: a dummy for the sex of the individual, a dummy for each education level, a dummy for
each decennial age group; the average wage, the population density, the unemployment rate, the share of
workers employed in the industry sector and the share of workers employed in the services sector in the
province-year cell of the individual; the province GDP level in 2014. Specifications (1) and (3) use OLS
estimator. Specification (2) and (4) use 2SLS using the shift-share instrument computed with 2003 as base
year and excluding Romanian immigrants. Standard errors are clustered at province level in all regressions.
R2 refers to regressions in first row.
*, **, ***: coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively
Table 4.6 reports the results of Equation (3.3) and (3.7) using these extended definitions
for the dependent variables. As can be seen, my results are robust to the definition of the
manual and communication-intensity indices. The estimation of δ, in fact, remain positive and
statistically significant for all the specifications, even though the absolute values become lower
(the coefficent in Column 1 passes from 0.48 to 0.291, while the coefficient in Column 2 from
0.751 to 0.446). In this case too, the main driver of this variation is the drop in the supply
of manual tasks by natives, rather than an increase in the supply of communication tasks (and
actually δC becomes not statistically different from zero in the specification using individuals as
unit of observation).
4.4.2 Romanian immigrants
In Section 3.1, it has been pointed out that the high share of immigrants coming from Romania
is explained by the fact that Romanian is a Romance language as Italian and then Romanians
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have fewer difficulties in learning Italian with respect to other languages. This insight can have
a relevant impact on my analysis since the effect I want to detect in this dissertation is based on
the fundamental assumption that Italians own a comparative advantage in language proficiency
compared to immigrants. In my opinion, it is quite unrealistic to think that Romanians can
actually be comparable to natives in the knowledge of the language, however, it is better to
check if and how the effect changes by excluding immigrants from this specific country of
origin.
To do this, I recompute both the actual share of immigrants and the shift-share instrument
in each province-year cell excluding the number of immigrants coming from Romania and I
run again Equation (3.3) and (3.7) using both OLS and 2SLS estimators. Table 4.7 reports
the results of this analysis. As regards the effect on natives relative task supply (Column 1
and 2 of the table), the coefficients remain positive and statistically significant. The absolute
value becomes slightly greater (from 0.48 to 0.50 with OLS and from 0.72 to 0.81 with 2SLS),
indicating that Romanian has a lower impact in triggering the change in natives’ behaviour than
other immigrants. As before, the increase in the relative supply of communicative tasks by
natives is mainly due to a significant drop in their presence in manual-intensive jobs rather than
an increase in the communicative-intensive one. The same conclusions can be made looking at
Column (3) and (4) which instead consider the effect of immigration on the aggregate relative
task supply at the market level. It can be seen that also in this case there is no significant change
in the value of the coefficients, so that it follows that my results are robust to the language
proficiency level of Romanian immigrants
4.4.3 Omitted variable bias
In Subsection 3.3.1 I have copied with the fact that province fixed effects absorbed all the
variation in the share of immigrants by substituting them with region fixed effects and then
controlling for a series of variables concerning time-invariant province characteristics. This
process, even though not orthodox, should provide an acceptable approximation. However,
for reasons of data availability (my period of analysis is very close to the present and then
some economic statistics has not been published yet, as well as the fact that some province
characteristics are unobservable or difficult to measure), it is impossible for me to control for
all this kind of variables, so that my specifications may suffer of an omitted variable bias.
To check this hypothesis, I perform the Oster test developed by Oster (2019). This test
exploits the fact that, under specific assumptions, the observable controls can be informative
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Table 4.8: Oster test results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equation (3.3) (3.7) (3.4) (3.8)
a) First stage regressions
Dep. variable fi jt fi jt f jt f jt
Biased β 0.405 0.406 0.405 0.406
Unbiased β 0.810 0.811 0.822 0.822
Rmax 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000

























Biased β 0.289 0.150 0.520 0.275
Unbiased β 0.195 -0.023 0.616 0.401


























Biased β 0.715 0.369 1.285 0.677
Unbiased β 0.241 -0.028 0.749 0.487
Notes: Oster test is performed using the Stata command psacalc on the first-stage and
reduced-form regressions. Column (1) and (3) consider only native individuals, while
Column (2) amd (4) consider both native and immigrants individuals. Column (1) and
(2) refer to regressions with the dependent variable meaasured at the individual level. In
these specifications the dummy for the gender, the dummies for each age group, the dum-
mies for each educational level and the year fixed-effects are considered as variable not
explicative about the unobserved controls. Column (3) and (4) refer to regressions with
the dependent variable measured at the province-year level. In these specifications the
dummy for the gender, the dummies for each age group, the dummies for each educa-
tional level and the year fixed-effects are considered as variable not explicative about the
unobserved controls. 2SLS estimates are computed dividing the reduced-form coefficient
by the first-stage coefficient
about if and how the coefficient of interest would change if unobservable controls were added
to the regression. In particular, Oster (2019) shows that the omitted variable bias due to the
absence of the unobservable controls can be computed as a function of the movements in the R2
and in the value of the coefficient, induced by the introduction of the observable covariates.
Two fundamental assumptions should be made to make sure that the test works properly.
The first one is about the relationship between the effects that observable and unobservable
controls respectively have on the treatment variable. Since the controls I have included in my
regressions are unarguably the most important variables which affect the share of immigrants
in a local labor market (my variable of interest), I believe that it is quite unrealistic to think
that unobservable controls have a greater impact than observable. As a consequence, I assume
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that unobservable can be at most as important as observable (this is equal to setting a δ = 1
following Oster’s notation). The second assumption instead concerns the R-squared from the
hypothetical regression of Y on X and both the unobservable and observable controls (Rmax). In
this case, Oster (2019) suggest that Rmax should be set at 1.3R̃, where R̃ is the R-squared from
the regression of Y on X and the observable controls.
Table 4.8 reports the coefficients of interest of first-stage and reduced-form regressions2, as
well as the 2SLS estimations, computed dividing the latter by the former, before (“biased β”)
and after (“unbiased β”) the Oster test. Columns (1) and (2) refers to the regressions linked to
Equation (3.3) and (3.4), and therefore use individuals as observational units, whereas Columns
(3) and (4) to Equation (3.7) and (3.8), and therefore use province-year cells as observational
units. In performing the test, I consider the dummy for the gender, those for the age group, those
for the educational level and the year fixed effects as covariates not related to unobservable
controls, so that the region fixed effects, the unemployment rate, the GDP level in 2014, the
population density and the shares of workers in the industry and in the services sectors are the
variables used to compute the bias.
As regards the first-stage regressions, after the Oster test all the coefficients increase, show-
ing a bigger relationship between the real share of immigrants in a province-year cell and the
share estimated using the shift-share instrument in Equation (3.9). More precisely, the coeffi-
cient has doubled, passing from about 0.405 to 0.810. Focusing on reduced-form regression
instead, regressions using individuals as units of observation (Column 1 and 2) show an un-
biased coefficient which is lower than before, while in the others the coefficient is greater. In
particular, it is worth noting that in Column (2) the coefficient has become negative, indicating
that the response of natives could not be great enough to compensate the increase in the relative
supply of manual skills induced by immigration, with the overall effect of a reduction of the
relative supply provision of communicative tasks at the market level. Anyway, the coefficient
is very close to zero and it may be not statistically significant. As a result of these variations,
all the 2SLS coefficients have become lower, because of the great increase in the first-stage
regression coefficient.
2Results of reduced-form regression are reported in Appendix B.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
Labor market effects of immigration remains one of the most puzzling issues faced by economists.
Basically all the theoretical models concerning this topic agree in asserting that a positive labor
supply shock, caused by an inflow of workers from abroad in the labor market, has a negative
effect on the main outcomes of the natives, especially for those presenting characteristics that
are more similar to those of the immigrants. Empirical researches, however, have not found
unambiguous evidence able to confirm such predictions yet. For this reason, a recent branch
of the literature has started to consider the hypothesis that previous models could be based on
too simple assumptions, one of these represented by the fact that immigrants and natives with
the same educational level and work experience are completely identical in performing all the
productive tasks. In this regard, it is instead reasonable to think that natives own a comparative
advantage in communicative and language-intensive tasks, whereas immigrants own a compar-
ative advantage in manual and physical tasks, and that the two groups of workers specialize
accordingly. If this is the case, then the negative effects that immigration should induce in
wages and employment opportunities of natives can be significantly lower.
This dissertation tries to find evidence for this assumption, by studying the Italian labor
market. In particular, my empirical analysis used O*NET data to measure the task content of
the occupations in the Istat Labor Force Survey for the period 2014-2019. My results support
the aforementioned assumption. I find that a one percentage-point increase in the share of
immigrants is associated with a strongly statistically significant 0.72 percent increase in the
relative supply of communicative versus manual task by natives. This rise is explained for three
quarters by a drop in the supply of manual tasks and just for the remaining part by an increase
in the supply of communicative ones. This effect is slightly higher for young and low-skilled
natives (those who suffer the most the competition of immigrants in Italy) and in the Center
rather than in the North of the country, while it is not significant in the South. Comparing
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my results with those of similar papers on the topic, my coefficient is twice as bigger as that
estimated by Peri and Sparber (2009) in the United States between 1960 and 2000, but in line
with that estimated by Amuedo-Dorantes and De La Rica (2011) in Spain between 2000 and
2008.
Another interesting finding of my analysis regards the effect on the aggregate relative sup-
ply. The theoretical model predicts that immigration should, at least in a first moment, decrease
the relative supply of communicative skills in the economy, since immigrants have a compar-
ative advantage in manual-intensive jobs. This reduction should induce a rise in the relative
compensation of communicative-intensive occupations, the fact that should mostly trigger the
previously estimated reaction by natives. In this respect, my study finds that a one percent
increase in the share of immigrants is actually associated with a statistically significant 0.37%
rise in the aggregate relative supply of communicative versus manual tasks. This result indicates
that the reaction of natives is large enough to compensate for the initial reduction, suggesting
that factors other than wage may be also determinant in the natives’ choice of specializing in
communicative-intensive occupations.
However, because of very scant data availability, for my analysis I have been forced to use
a specification which is not my “first-best”. In this regards, I checked whether the impossibility
to introduce all the controls has generated an omitted variable bias by performing the Oster
test, finding that in my main specifications an upward bias actually exists. More precisely, the
predicted “unbiased” coefficients imply that a 1 percent increase in the share of immigrants in
a local labor market is associated with a 0.24 and -0.03 percent variation in the relative supply
of communicative tasks by natives and at the market level, respectively. The second coefficient
is, though marginally, in contrast with the positive effect previously detected, indicating that the
earlier result is not robust to the inclusion of possible omitted variable. As a consequence, I
cannot exclude that the impact of immigration on the aggregate relative supply could actually
be zero.
Overall, my findings have some relevant policy implications. In the first place, the fact that
natives react to an increase in the share of foreign-born workers by specializing in occupations
in which immigrants cannot compete corroborates the results of those papers that find small or
negligible impact of immigration on the wages and employment opportunities of Italians. Con-
firming that immigration does not negatively affect labor market outcomes of Italian natives is a
crucial point for a country which may be forced to rely on large inflows of workers from abroad
to deal with the inevitable issues concerning the sustainability of its welfare system, caused by
the population aging. In the second place, these results also suggest that immigration, inducing
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natives towards task specialization and occupational upgrading, is able to raise job mobility,
enhancing the job matching efficiency and in general the overall productivity of the economy.
This is particularly important in a country like Italy, characterized by a large proportion of
open-ended contracts and high Employment Protection Legislation levels.
Appendix A
Indices definitions
Table A.1: Definitions of task-intenisity indices









Arm-hand steadiness, manual dexterity, finger dex-
terity, control precision, multilimb coordination,
response orientation, rate control, reaction time,




Extent flexibility, dynamic flexibility, gross body
coordination, gross body equilibrium
Strength Static strength, explosive strength, dynamic








Perceptual speed, spatial orientation, visualization,
selective attention, time sharing
Visual
perception
Near vision, far vision, visual color discrimination,











Oral Oral comprehension, oral expression
Written Written comprehension, written expression
Extended definition:





Fluency of ideas, originality, problem sensitivity,
category flexibility, mathematical reasoning, num-
ber facility, deductive reasoning, inductive reason-
ing, information ordering, memorization, speed of
closure, flexibility of closure
Vocal Speech recognition, speech clarity
Notes: O*NET variables are from the O*Net ability survey available at https://www.onetcenter.org/database.html. The defi-




Table B.1: Reduced-form regressions

























f̃ jt 0.289*** 0.150** 0.520*** 0.275***
(0.073) (0.065) (0.072) (0.054)
Ind. controls Yes Yes No No
Province controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 697,037 774,216 648 648
R2 0.370 0.349 0.89 0.873
Notes: Dependent variables in the first row. The explanatory variable is the shift-share instrument
computed with 2003 as base year. Specification (1) and (2) use individuals as observational data.
The dependent variables in these specification are the relative supply of communicative tasks by
natives and at the market level, respectively. Specification (3) and (4) use province-year cells as
observational units. In these specifications, the dependent variables are the reltive supply of com-
municative tasks by natives and at the market level, respectively and the coeffcients are computed
with WLS, using the number of observations in each province-year cell as weights. Specification
(1) and (3) includes only native individuals, whereas specification (2) and (4) includes both native
and foreign-born individuals. Individual controls include a dummy for the sex of the individual,
a dummy for each decennial age group and a dummy for each education level. Province controls
include the unemployment rate, the population density, the Gdp in 2014, the mean wage, the share
of workers employed in the industry sector and the share of workers employed in the services
sector in each province-year cell. Region and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Clustered standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
*, **, ***: coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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